Practical Ethics
Chapter 8, Elements of a Practical Morality, Mackie (1977)
12 Nov 2024
The Good Life
What is the good life for man? Mackie writes that the good life:
In other words, I do something good when that something satisfies my own interests and that of those who are closely related to me. Moreover, I would approve of such a life. This is a very broad definition. It seems like we haven't really said anything about what the good life consists of. But this is deliberately so. Mackie argues that it is difficult to come up with a more specific definition of the good life, because (1) different people have different views of what the good life consists of, and (2) the answer cannot be answered in purely abstract terms. The answer to the question of what the good life consists of must be grounded in reality.
Although the question cannot be fully answered in the abstract, we can still talk about the good life in general terms. Mackie writes that the good life involves the pursuit of activities that are either intrinsically good or that bring about some benefits to ourselves and others closely related to us. Interestingly, Mackie rejects the idea that we should be concerned about the interests of all humanity. This is too abstract and impractical. Instead, our effort should be focused on the interests of those who are closely related to us, or who shares the same interests as us. However, we shouldn't take this too far and become extreme egoists. Just because we should be concerned about our own interests and those closely related to us, doesn't mean that we should be indifferent to the interests of others. Human life is fundamentally social, and any reasonable person will recognize that his own happiness is often intertwined or contingent on the happiness of others.
The view that the good life consists in the pursuit of activities that are beneficial to ourselves and others closely related to us may entail some degree of competition and conflict between individuals and between groups. But we can invent ethical rules to help us manage these conflicts. Thus, morality is a device that helps us counteract the negative consequences of egoism and self-referential altruism.
Basic Moral Principles
Mackie goes on to discuss some common basic principles of morality that he sees as widely accepted in most societies. He starts with the notion of rights. A system of rights is a moral device used to grant people the freedom to do something. More technically, to say that someone has a right to act is to say that he is not forbidden from acting in the way indicated, and that others are obliged to support his claim to act in that way. A set of rights secures for the individual certain areas of freedom of action, and since the good life for an individual consists in the pursuit of his own interests, whatever they may be, he needs some area in which he is free to make choices that contribute to his pursuit of happiness.
Again, we are speaking in very abstract terms here. Although it seems to be the case that there should be some rights, but the question of what rights should be recognized is still open. In fact, Mackie argues that specific rights cannot be determined a priori, and that they should not be absolute. Consider the right to the ownership of property. One view, derived from Locke, is that property is acquired through the mixing of our labour with some common property, under the condition that there is enough and as good left for others. This condition, however, can never be satisfied in practice. Thus, Locke's theory, as an absolute theory based on self-evident first principles, has no practical application. This is not to say that there can be no rights to property, but that such rights cannot be derived from absolute principles. A practical theory of property should consist of a cluster of rights, worked out and adjusted by various considerations of social practicality.
This theme of practicality is central to Mackie's approach to ethics. We see this in his discussion of the notion of liberty. Mill argued that there can be no justification for interefering with the liberty of an individual unless his actions harm others. As long as his actions concern only himself, he should be free to do as he pleases. But how much of our actions concern only ourselves? Given that human life is fundamentally social, our conduct will very likely to have repercussions in the lives of others. Thus, a practical theory of liberty cannot be based on a supposedly self-evident principle of non-interference alone, but must contain principles which allow interference when necessary, i.e. when the actions of an individual affects others in some way that doesn't harmonize with the general good. Liberties often conflict with one another, therefore what we need is not a general defence of liberty as an absolute right, but a set of principles that can help us resolve conflicts between rival claims to freedom.
What about lying? Is it always wrong to lie, or are there ethical situations where lying is permissible? Mackie argues that lying is not wrong in itself, though if we are to take cooperation and trust to be important values, then it would be preferable and natural to tell the truth. Most lies will in time be discovered to be such, therefore it is often better to tell the truth, even to our enemies. Our enemies will believe what we say, including our lies, only if they believe that we are generally truthful.
Agreements, on the other hand, must be handled differently, primarily because we enter into agreements voluntarily, and we expect others to keep their promises. Such institutions as agreements and promises are essential to the good life, because they help regulate conflicts and competition between individuals and groups. Mackie adds that it is important to have agreements with different degrees of bindingness, depending on the context. Strongly binding agreements are especially important in the context of business and politics, where there is more conflict and less spontaneous cooperation. Deception in business and politics is one thing, given the competitive nature of these activities, but breaking solemn agreements is another, much more serious matter, because it undermines the institution of agreements as a device for regulating conflicts and competition. In a society with a weak institution of agreements, people will resort to giving only "shaky assurances", where they are less willing to trust each other because they fear that the other party will not keep their promises. This is worse than giving no assurances at all, because it forces us to spend more effort in monitoring and enforcing agreements, including implementing contingency plans in case the other party breaks the agreement. In severe cases it may lead to a complete breakdown of cooperation, leading to all-out conflict.
Mackie discusses virtue ethics next. According to Aristotle, the good for man is well-being or eudaimonia, which is achieved by living a life in accordance with virtue, virtue being an intermediate or mean between two extremes (excess and defect). Aristotle, however, doesn't give a clear account of how to determine the mean, writing only that the mean is determined by practical wisdom. Mackie extends Aristotle's account by arguing that there are three possible ways to determine the mean: (1) virtues are those qualities that are conventionally admired or approved of; (2) virtues are those qualities that harmonize with our own conception of the good; and (3) virtues are those qualities that harmonize with understanding, with seeing things as they are, whereas vices are those which requires a distortion of reality in order to be maintained. Courage, for instance, would be defined as the quality of being able to face danger without exaggerating or underestimating the danger. Mackie approves of the virtue ethics framework, because it develops dispositions for preferential choice, which is more flexible and adaptive than, say, a set of instincts and habits.
Finally, Mackie discusses ethical issues surrounding life and death. A right to life is a right to be free from being killed, and the corresponding obligation is to refrain from killing. Mackie argues that such a right, though fundamental, is not absolute. For instance, it is possible to justify killing in self-defence. The point is that we should not take the right to life as an absolute right, but as a right that can be overridden by other considerations. Moreover, many activities that we engage in, such as driving cars, involve some risk of killing others, and yet we don't refrain from engaging in these activities. What matters is that we understand the risks involved, along with the benefits, and that we only engage in these activities without undue risk to others. Related to the right to life is the right to end one's own life. This too, Mackie argues, is not an absolute right. There may be other considerations involving other people that may override the right to end one's own life. But these considerations would have to be very strong. Also, Mackie writes that suicide would be permissible in certain cases. For example, a person who is kept half-alive by machines, and who sees no value in continuing to live, may have a right to end his own life.
Mackie emphasises that these are difficult issues, and that we should discuss them more thoroughly, preferably in a more practical context involving real people and real situations. The topic of abortion, for instance, is one such difficult issue. Mackie points out three grounds for justifying abortion: (1) to prevent a risk to the mother's life; (2) there are reasons to believe that the child will be born with severe defects; and (3) the mother simply doesn't want the child. Someone who is against abortion may argue that the unborn child is already a human being, with a right to life, and that abortion is therefore murder. But Mackie argues that setting fertilization as the starting point of human life, though salient, is inadequate as a criterion for determining the right to life. He writes that it is more reasonable to think of the right to life as growing gradually in strength, but still very slight immediately after birth. Under this view, the third ground for justifying abortion would be valid early in the pregnancy, but not later on, whereas the first and second grounds would be valid throughout the pregnancy.