Nietzsche's Slave Morality
On the Genealogy of Morality, Essay I
26 March 2024
In Genealogy, Nietzsche explores the origin and evolution of morality in Western society. Nietzsche suspects that conventional ideas of morality, based on altruistic values, do not help us thrive. He argues that, in early societies, the concept of "good" was associated with the qualities of the ruling class, i.e. strength, aggression, and ambition. The oppressed class, however, despised the ruling class, and developed a new concept of "good" that was based on their own qualities, i.e. meekness, humility, and compassion. Their effort successfully undermined the ruling class's values, and the new concept of "good" became the dominant moral code thereafter. This slave morality, as Nietzsche calls it, extends to modern society, and has had catastrophic consequences. People, obsessed with being "good" in the oppressive sense, are denied any outlet for their natural instincts, including aggression and cruelty, and are forced to repress them. This repression leads to guilt, mental anguish, suffering, depression, self-harm, and, in the extreme case, a desire for death. Nietzsche extends his criticism of slave morality to asceticism, claiming that the ascetic ideals are just as unhealthy as the ideals of the oppressed class, because they similarly encourage people to reject their natural instincts, and to withdraw from life.
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Good and Evil, Good and Bad. Nietzsche disagrees with the view that goodness is derived from the recipient of an action. Under this framework, a person is good when his actions benefit others. Instead, Nietzsche argues that goodness is derived from the ruling class of a society. The aristocrats, who wield power and influence, claimed the right to create values, and declared their own qualities to be good. Thus, a person is good when he exhibits the qualities of the ruling class (strength, power, nobility), and less good, or bad, when he exhibits the opposite qualities, those of the common people (gentleness, weakness, humility). It is the ruling class, their traits, along with the power dynamic inherent in the way society is structured, that is the true origin of the good/bad dichotomy. Nietzsche supports his claim by describing the etymological origin of the word "good"". He finds that, everywhere around Europe, the word "good" was originally associated with the noble and the aristocratic. The Greek aristocrats described themselves as "ἐσθλός", or truthful, and the common people as "χαχόςm", or cowardly. The Latin word for good, "bonus", is similar to "duonus", meaning warrior. The Germanic tribe that conquered the Roman provinces, who called themselves the Goths, is similar to "gut", good, whereas the German word for bad, "schlect", is similar to "schlich", meaning simple or plain.
Nietzsche then dicusses religious societies, where the priests replaced the aristocrats as the ruling class. Since the priests were highly influential, they were able to claim moral superiority, and they redefined the concept of "good" to align with their own priestly qualities of purity (cleanliness, health, abstinence). The proliferation of religious societies led to a shift in the dominant moral code of Western societies, from the aristocratic values to the priestly values. Nietzsche is highly critical of this shift. He thinks that such "slave morality" is life-denying because it rejects natural human instincts that make life interesting, instincts such as pride, revenge, acumen, debauchery, and lust. Nietzsche also makes the claim that the priests developed their moral code, not only because they wielded power, but also because they resented the aristocrats, whom they were unable to compete with. He cites the example of the Jude-Christian tradition, where the Jewish people, who loathed their Roman oppressors, but were unable to challenge them physically, revolted by developing their own moral codes opposite of the oppressors. Both traditions, Judaism and Christianity, were created as such. Christianity, however, gained the upper hand because it was in a special position to exploit the resentment of the oppressed. The crucifixion of Jesus by the Roman oppressors provided the oppressed with a crucial symbol: they saw the event as an opportunity to embody and champion the values of suffering, universal love, and salvation. The masses "took the bait" because the new moral code enabled them to claim and declare moral superiority over the aristocrats, ultimately triggering a society-wide shift away from the aristocratic values to the priestly values. Nietzsche adds that the institution of the Church played a crucial role in the spread of the priestly values, but he questions whether it was a necessary component, given that modern societies, which are largely secular, are still entrenched in the priestly values.
Nietzsche states his case for why he thinks that the priestly moral code was developed out of resentment. He argues that there is a psychological phenomenon at play here. The ruling class is stronger and more powerful, by definition of their position in society. They were also aware of their superiority, which they use as a basis for their claim to moral superiority. Nietzsche finds this admirable, because it operates from a position of authenticity. The oppressed, on the other hand, operates from a position of inauthenticity. They were unable to recognise their own weaknesses, and instead circumvented their shortcomings by emphasising their cunning and intelligence, rebranding their weakness as cleverness. Still, the fact remained that the oppressed are weak, and Nietzsche claims that they were of this fact, but could not really do anything about it. The only way out is through cleverly labelling and demonising their oppressors as "evil", and themselves as "good". Nietzsche then describes the psychological trick that the oppressed used to convince themselves of their own goodness. The oppressed split the idea of strength from the actual manifestation of strength. Under this framework, it becomes possible for one to choose to be strong, by declaring so, without actually manifesting the qualities of strength. Likewise, weakness becomes a choice, and it becomes possible for one to declare one's weakness as a conscious choice, an accomplishment, an expression of one's freedom. Such thinking opens the way for the oppressed to claim moral superiority over the oppressors, and to call them out for being responsible for acting oppressively. This "cleverness of the lowest rank", to use Nietzsche's terms, is actually a form of self-deception, and it provides the oppressed with a veil to cover their own weaknesses. The success in the proliferation of such "slave morality" lies in the crafting of such illusion, which enables the weak and the oppressed to pronounce their weakness as a conscious choice, an accomplishment, masked through values like selflessness, humility, compassion, and patience. Thus, timidity becomes humility; cowardice becomes patience; submission becomes obedience to God; retribution becomes justice; impotence becomes goodness; and self-inflicted misery becomes the ultimate test of faith.
Nietzsche contrasts the "good/evil" dichotomy of the oppressed with the "good/bad" dichotomy of the aristocrats, where "bad" is merely the counterpart of "good", an incidental notion. "Evil", on the other hand, represents a profound concept crafted by the oppressed out of resentment toward their oppressors. They feel alienated and inferior, which prompts them to brand the aristocrats as "beasts of prey", associating them with barbarianism for their instinctual drive to conquer and dominate. They believe that the pinnacle of civilization lies in its ability to tame and domesticate these "beasts." Nietzsche, however, disagrees. He sees the taming of exceptional individuals in society as a sign of civilizational decline, noting that the greatest danger of modern civilisation is the spread of egalitarianism, because it fosters mediocrity. A domesticated human is considered to be weak, cowardly, mediocre, and lacking in desirability, despite these being the very ideals promoted by the priestly moral code. Nietzsche is unable to accept the current state of affairs, writing that he is suffocated by the "bad air" emanating from modern civilisation. Nevertheless, he remains hopeful for humanity's ability to overcome this decline, trusting in the emergence of rare, exceptional individuals who can see through the current state of affairs, transcend it, and restore the aristocratic values of strength, power, and happiness.
The two moral codes are diametrically opposed to each other. The tension that exists between them can be seen throughout history. The canonical example is the conflict between Judea and Rome in the first century. Rome and its noble values were defeated, which led to the rise of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The rediscovery and the reawakening of the aristocratic ideals during the Renaissance in the 1500s was short-lived, thanks to the resentiment-movement of the Reformation. The priestly moral code triumphed once again over the classical ideals during the French Revolution in the late 1700s, where the monarchy, which represented the political nobility, was overthrown by the resentful masses. The emergence of Napoleon took Nietzsche by surprise. Napoleon was a product of the priestly values, yet he embodied the aristocratic values. He was the bodily incarnation of the ancient ideals, a reaction to the resentment slogans of democracy and egalitarianism. Niezsche calls Napoleon a "synthesis of the Unmensch (inhuman, brute) and the Übermensch (overman, superman)."
Is the battle over? Nietzsche thinks it is hard to say. He writes that the study of the history of morality is still in its infancy, and that there is much to be done. He points out specifically the need for a history of etymology, which can serve as a valuable tool in understanding the origin of moral concepts and evolution of moral hierarchies.