Natural Goodness - III
Phillipa Foot (2001)
21 Dec 2024
Natural norms
Foot thinks that we can evaluate human actions the same way we evaluate other living things. To describe an individual member of a species is to situate it within the life form of that species. For example, to fully comprehend a statement like "Odie is barking", we must understand the action of barking as an activity that is characteristic of the species of dogs. Dogs bark, and since Odie is a dog, the statement 'Odie is barking' makes sense. If we didn't know that Odie was a dog, then the most we could say is that Odie is making some noise.
Thus, to describe an organism is to situate it at the same time within the life form of its species. Foot goes further and writes that to situate an organism within the life form of its species is to consider it from a normative perspective. Given general statements or facts about the species, we can make evaluative judgements about individual members of that species, based on the norms that characterize the species. For example, we know that dogs bark, and so we can evaluate dogs based on their ability to bark. A dog that barks is a good dog, and, likewise, a dog that is unable to bark is considered bad, or defective.
However, not all general statements about the species are significant for evaluating goodness. Foot writes that only those that are teleological and concern life functions are relevant, i.e. those having to do with either self-maintenance or reproduction. The barking of dogs falls under such a category, because barking helps dogs to communicate with each other, and to fend off potential threats.
Foot extends this idea to human beings and argues that there are norms that are essential to human life. She acknowledges that humans are unique in that we are capable of rational thought, but, nevertheless, she points out that we can describe certain general features of human life that are necessary for human flourishing. For example, the development of a functioning larynx is crucial for producing speech, which is essential for human communication. Mental abilities are also crucial for human life, as they enable us to think and reason. There are also social norms that are essential for human life, such as the ability to form relationships with others, and to cooperate with them. Given that these are norms that are essential for human life, we can evaluate human actions based on these norms, and say, for example, that a human being who is unable to speak is defective, or that a human being who is unable to reason is defective, or that a human being who is unable to form relationships with others is defective.
Human norms
Foot acknowledges that there are some difficulties with applying the idea of natural norms to human beings. We may find it difficult to reduce questions of human goodness to questions of self-maintenance or reproduction, as we do with other non-human species. For instance, a lack of capacity to reproduce may be considered a defect in a human being. But a person may find it rational to remain childless (e.g. due to work commitments or personal choice), and it wouldn't make sense to say that such a person is defective. Moreover, the diversity of human cultures and practices may make it difficult to identify universal norms that are essential for human life.
Nevertheless, Foot thinks that it is still possible to identify certain human necessities that are generally needed for human good. One starting point may be to consider the negative idea of human deprivation. The lack of certain abilities or capacities may be considered a defect, in that it deprives a person of the opportunity to live a good life. Foot lists some examples of such abilities or capacities, such as the ability to produce speech through a functioning larynx, the mental capacity for learning language, the powers of imagination to understand stories, the ability to cooperate and form relationships with others, and so on. We could still survive and reproduce ourselves without these abilities, but we would be deprived.
The idea of human deprivation also applies to the domain of morality. Such virtues as industriousness, loyalty, fairness, kindness, and so on, are essential for not only survival, but also for establishing relationships with others. Given that human beings are social animals, the ability to form relationships with others is crucial for human life. It would be difficult for us to do so without knowing how to be kind, or how to be fair, or how to be loyal. Thus, virtues and moral norms are also essential for human life, and for avoiding human deprivation.
Promises
The institution of promising is an example of a human practice that is essential for human life. Anscombe (1969) wrote that promises enable us to "bind another's will" so that we can coordinate our actions with others. The crucial point is that, without such an institution, we wouldn't be able to get each other to do the things that we want them to do in a reliable manner. One example that Anscombe gives is that of a parent relying on a promise to secure their child's future in the event of the parent's death. Since the ability to make and keep promises belong to such 'Aristotelian necessities', i.e. those necessities on which the good hang, to break a promise would be to act badly.
A utilitarian might object that the moral force of promises may be removed if, in a particular case, breaking a promise wouldn't lead to any significant harm. But Foot argues that the moral force of promises is not dependent on the consequences of breaking them. A person may be inclined to keep a promise because not doing so would undermine the trust and respect that others have for them. Since disrespect and mistrust are bad, in that they corrode our relationships with others, breaking a promise would be considered bad, even if it doesn't lead to any significant harm. The consequentialist model of good or bad state of affairs is not a fundamental proposition in Foot's theory of natural normativity, though it can play a role in our deliberations about what to do in particular cases. We may consider the consequences of certain actions and include them in our framework of practional rationality.