Natural Goodness - II
Phillipa Foot (2001)
20 Dec 2024
Against subjectivism
Foot begins by attacking various subjectivist theories of ethics, specifically emotivism and prescriptivism. Both theories are predicated on the idea that there is a fundamental distinction between facts and values. Unlike factual statements, the truth of evaluative statements must be conditioned on certain attitudes or emotions held by the speaker. For such statements as 'lying is wrong' to be true, the speaker must have got a certain attitude or feeling, or be in some 'conative' state of mind, or is ready to prescribe a certain course of action.
Foot claims that such theories are mistaken, because no such gap exists between facts and values. We can make evaluate statements that are free from any subjective attitudes or emotions. She acknowledges that subjectivist theories are correct in pointing out that evaluative statements such as moral judgements are action-guiding, i.e. that they are meant to produce and prevent certain actions. However, Foot thinks that subjectivist theories meet this criterion in the wrong way.
Practical rationality
Foot presents her own account of understanding the action-guiding nature of moral judgements, based on the idea of practical rationality. We act in a certain way because we have certain reasons, including moral reasons, for doing so. Foot, however, points out that moral reasons are not the only considerations that we take into account when deciding what course of action to take. Other reasons, some having to do with our own self-interest, or fulfilling the desires of ourselves or others, also play a role in our decision-making.
The different considerations are on a par in that a judgement about what is required by practical rationality must take account of their interaction: of the weight of the ones we call non-moral as well as those we call moral.
To better understand the relation between goodness of choice and practical rationality, we can turn to virtues. A virtue is defined such that whoever posseses it, his or her actions are good, or that he or she acts well. But what is it that compels a virtuous person to act in a certain way? Foot writes that it is because the virtuous person recognizes certain considerations as powerful and compelling reasons for action. Thus, a just person, for example, is said to act justly because he or she recognizes certain considerations, that are relevant in the sphere of justice, as reasons for acting in a certain way, i.e. in a just way. Moreover, he or she also recognizes certain limitations on what can be done for the sake of a virtue. For instance, he or she may be honest in most of his or her daily dealings, but also may recognize that there are certain circumstances where he or she may be willing to lie for the sake of protecting a friend. Thus, virtues are closely tied to practical rationality, in that they are based on the recognition of certain relevant considerations as compelling reasons for action.
Natural goodness
Thus far, Foot has given an account of the action-guiding nature of moral judgements. Goodness stems from the recognition of certain considerations as compelling reasons for action, among which are moral reasons. But what makes certain considerations as compelling reasons for action? An honest person may recognize honesty and truthfulness as compelling reasons for action, but what prompts him or her to recognize so? Is it purely because honesty and truthfulness are abstract moral principles that are somehow universally binding on all rational agents, as Kant would have it? Foot thinks not. She argues that the recognition of certain considerations as compelling reasons for action is based on certain essential features of specifically human life. Virtous people act virtuously not because they are binded by certain abstract moral principles 'out there', which are universally binding on any agents capable of rational thought, but because these virtues depend on certain essential features of human life that are necessary for human flourishing.
Think of the necessity of water for the flourishing of plants, or of nests for birds, or of pack life for wolves. All these necessities depend on certain essential features of the life of these creatures, i.e. on what the particular species need, on their natural habitat, on their natural way of life. Similarly, we can come up with a list of human excellences that are necessary for human flourishing, such as the ability to reason, to learn languages, to see clearly, to cooperate, and various moral excellences such as honesty, justice, and courage. All these things determine what is good for human beings, which is also to say that they determine what human beings should be or do.
Although there is a huge difference between the natural life of human beings and other non-human creatures, the conceptual structure of describing what is good for members of a species and what is bad for them remain intact. One key distinction is that human beings are able to understand what is good for them, and to act on it, while other creatures do so instinctively, without necessarily understanding what they are doing. Still, the conceptual structure remain the same: we are able to evaluate human actions in the same way we evaluate other living things, by considering them from the normative perspective of their species.