Natural Goodness - I
Phillipa Foot (2001)
9 Dec 2024
Foot claims that it is possible to make judgements of goodness and badness about living things, whether plants, animals, or human beings. She defines such natural goodness as a kind of "intrinsic or 'autonomous' goodness in that it depends directly on the relation of an individual to the 'life form' of its species". The key idea here is of relation to a 'life form'. Consider the following statements:
The first statement is a general statement about the species of dogs. The latter two statements, on the other hand, describe Odie, a particular dog. Notice that, to understand the statement that Odie is barking, or Odie as a living organism, we must situate Odie within the species of dogs. Only against the background of the species of dogs can the activity of barking be understood. If we did not know that Odie was a dog, we could not say that Odie is barking, but rather that Odie is making some kind of noise out of his mouth.
Foot builds on this idea and argues that to situate an organism within the life form of its species is to consider it from a normative perspective. Given general statements about the species, we can make evaluative claims about particular organisms. For example, we can say that a dog is a defective dog if it is incapable of barking.
However, Foot adds that not all general statements about the species are normative, only those that are teleological and concern features and activities that are essential to the life form of the species, i.e. those that have to do with either self-maintenance and reproduction. Moreover, in making a general claim about a species, we need to consider also the environment or natural habitat in which the organism of the species lives. Thus, a dog that does not bark is defective because barking helps fend off intruders and communicate with other dogs.
Foot extends this idea to human beings and argues that there are norms that are essential to human life. Although human activities are diverse, we can identify some general features that are conducive to human life, which helps us flourish as organisms of Homosapiens. For instance, there are physical properties such as the development of a larynx to produce speech, mental capacities for reasoning and learning, such as the ability to form abstract concepts, and social capacities for communication and cooperation, such as the ability to empathize with others, and to keep promises. These features are essential to human life, and a human being that lacks any of them can be said to be defective.
Thus, there are natural norms which allow us to evaluate living things as good or defective in terms of various telelogical activities having to do with self-maintenance and reproduction. But what about moral norms? Surely when we are thinking about what to do or how to act, we are not just concerned with questions of self-maintenance and reproduction. There are a set of considerations that go beyond just the biological, those which concern the social and moral aspects of human life.
To answer this question, we may first ask: what is it that distinguishes human beings from other living things? Foot writes that human brings are unique in that we are rational animals. Our capacity to act on reasons is what sets us apart from other living things. Animals go for something for an end, but they cannot apprehend it as an end. Human beings, on the other hand, can see something as an end, and act on it. Sheeps go for grass as an end, but they do not see or apprehend it as such. This has important implications, because it opens up the possibility for deliberation and choice, i.e. the possibility of acting on reasons. The same point can be made in terms of what is seen as good. Animals go for the good that they see, but we go for what we see as good.
Thus, being the rational animals that we are, we can ask why we should act in a certain way, and contemplate the reasons for our actions. Having established this point, Foot goes on to argue that anyone who acts in a manner contrary to reason is said to be ipso facto defective. But not all reasons are reasons for doing something. Foot points out that we can make 'should' or reason-statements that are relative to certain considerations, which stand on its own, such as 'I should study because I want to pass the exam', and also other reasons that are 'final', in that to act contrary to them is to be defective, as in 'I should study because I would have to retake the course if I fail the exam, or, in the worst case, I would have to drop out of school'.
Having shown that human beings are rational animals capable of acting on reasons, and to act contrary to an 'all things considered' reason is to be defective, Foot goes on to establish the link between reasons for action and moral goodness. The central idea of her argument lies in "seeing goodness as setting a necessary condition for practical rationality". In other words, moral considerations are one set of considerations that generate reasons for action, among other considerations, e.g. those based on desires or preferences. Thus, if some moral consideration impels us to act in a certain way, i.e. if it is a final 'all things considered' reason, but we do not act in that way, then we are ipso facto defective.
Moral considerations, although they appear weighty, are not that different from other considerations that move us to act in a certain way. According to Foot, we treat moral considerations as special because they are often used in a public way, i.e. they are considerations that we use to justify our actions to each other, through the language of obligation and duty, and through expressions of approval or disapproval. In this public sphere, we are concerned not only with what we see as good for ourselves, but what we see as good for everyone, or the public good. We use special terms to describe the actions of those who commit moral transgressions, such as 'wicked' and 'evil', but other terms such as 'foolish' for those who act in, say, some self-destructive way.
Despite this, Foot maintains that no special distinction is required between considerations that are moral and those that are not. Both can be seen as generating reasons for action, and both can be seen as setting necessary conditions for practical rationality. Therefore, both can be evaluated in terms of goodness and badness, depending on whether they are acted upon or not.
Foot uses the umbrella term 'evaluations of the rational human will' to describe both types of evaluations. Such evaluations share certain common features, for instance, both are concerned with voluntary actions: it is reasonable to absolve someone of blame if they can show that their actions were not voluntary, e.g. if they were coerced or forced to act under duress. But this applies to other non-moral considerations as well. We do not say that someone is acting foolishly, from a self-interested perspective, when what he does is involuntary, as in the case of someone who loses his wallet to a pickpocket, after taking all necessary precautions to prevent it.
Moreover, goodness or badness can come from different features of an action. We can evaluate an action based on the nature of the action itself, e.g. lying or killing are bad actions in themselves, or based on the end for which the action is done, e.g. saving a victim's life so that one can continue to exploit him is still bad. It is also possible to evaluate an action based on its relation to the agent's judgement of the goodness or badness of the action, e.g. someone who acts in a way which he sees as bad is itself bad, for how can we say that a human being is acting well in doing something that he sees as bad? A person who acts contrary to what reason dictates he should do is ipso facto defective.
The point here is that such evaluations of the rational human will are not restricted to moral considerations, but can be applied to a wider range of considerations, including those that concern self-interest. Self-mutiliation is by nature bad, and someone who brings harm to himself, even if he sees it as good, is still acting badly.
In conclusion, Foot argues that we can make judgements of goodness and badness about living things, whether plants, animals, or human beings, based on natural norms that are essential to the life form of the species. The force of the argument lies in the idea that to grasp an organism requires us to situate it within the life form of its species, in terms of various teleological activities having to do with self-maintenance and reproduction. But to look at organisms against the background of the species is to consider them from a normative perspective, which implies that we can make evaluative claims about them. Any particular organism that diverges from the general features of the species can be said to be defective.
Now, since human beings are living organisms, we can apply the same conception of natural goodness to human beings. We engage in various activities that are essential to human life, such as reasoning, learning, communicating, and cooperating. But perhaps the most important feature of our species is our rationality, or our capacity to act on reasons. Foot claims that to act contrary to what reason dictates is to be ipso facto defective. In deciding or contemplating what to do, we must look into various considerations that generate reasons for action, such as desires, preferences, and, notably, moral considerations. Moral considerations are not that different from other non-moral considerations, because both share the same features of concerning the voluntary, and both can be evaluated based on the various dimensions of an action. Thus, moral considerations can be seen as generating reasons for action, and as setting necessary conditions for practical rationality. Anyone who acts contrary to reason, when certain moral considerations impel him, all things considered, to act in a certain way, can be said to be defective.