Moral Error Theory - VI
Chapter 6, After Error Theory: The "What Next?" Question, Joyce (2024)
25 Nov 2024
Given that moral discourse commits us to the world being a way that it is not (i.e. to the existence of objective moral facts), what are we to do next? Joyce suggests that we should devise new ways of thinking and talking about moral facts without committing ourselves to their existence. One avenue is to rely on fictionalism, and to treat moral discourse as stories and myths that we tell each other, rather than as assertions of fact. This way, we can retain the benefits of having moral discourse without paying the costs of committing ourselves to the existence of moral facts.
First, Joyce steps back to consider the question of whether we should abolish uttering falsehoods in general. The answer, he suggests, is no. We utter falsehoods all the time: when we're acting, joking, lying, and so on. The crucial point is that we are uttering these falsehoods non-assertorically, i.e. we are not committing ourselves to their truth. Despite this, we may still be able to derive some practical benefits from uttering falsehoods (e.g. telling a white lie to protect someone's feelings), though Joyce acknowledges that these benefits are not "life-changing", and that we can probably find other ways to achieve the same benefits without resorting to falsehoods. Still, the practice of uttering falsehoods has its place in our daily lives, and there is no need to abolish it.
Thus, Joyce thinks we shouldn't abolish falsehoods in general. But what about moral falsehoods? Since moral discourse is error-prone, should we take the abolitionist stance and abandon moral discourse altogether? This question is more complex. To start, we can consider the two ways in which we might ask the question: as an individual, and as a group.
The answer to the question when posed to an indvidual is that it depends, though generally speaking the individual should play along and pretend that moral facts exist, for the sake of social convenience. Joyce points out that its natural for humans to switch between different modes of discourse depending on the context (where, who, for what purpose, etc.). But this strategy has its limits. For one, when we lie, we are still committing ourselves to the existence of moral facts externally: others might take us to be sincere, even if that's not the case internally.
More technically, a fully satisfactory strategy would have to involve "nonassertoric affirmation" (with regards to the language used) and "nondoxastic acceptance" (with regards to the mental state of the speaker). The advice to the individual that they should play along fails on the first count: a lie is not a nonassertoric affirmation, but an insincere assertion, though it passes the second condition, as it doesn't require audience participation: the speaker can play along internally and embrace the fact that they are lying, without harm.
What about the group? What kind of strategy should they adopt? Again, it depends. Here, the group setting has the advantage of being able to establish linguistic conventions to govern moral discourse. Specifically, the group can decide to treat any moral discourse as fictional, and to not take it literally. This way, both the conditions of nonassertoric affirmation and nondoxastic acceptance can be met.