Moral Error Theory - IV

Chapter 4, The Argument from Moral Responsibility, Joyce (2024)

25 Nov 2024

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Joyce presents a brief overview of some arguments against moral responsibility.

First, what does it mean to be morally responsible for an action? We can look at this from two perspectives: attributability and accountability.

Attributability. When an agent performs an action that results in a bad outcome, can we conclude that the agent is bad? It depends on whether the agent has an excuse for their action. If the agent has no excuse, then it is reasonable to conclude that they are bad. But determining whether an agent has an excuse is not straightforward. There is the volitional condition, which states that an agent is excused if they lack control over their actions. There is also the epistemic condition, which states that an agent is excused if they lack knowledge of the consequences of their actions. Both conditions are problematic, because both involve the concept of free will, which is a contentious issue in philosophy. Some hard determinists argue that there is no free will, therefore no one can be held morally responsible for their actions. Even if we have some degree of control over our actions, there are still external factors at play that can influence the outcome of our actions, e.g. genetics, upbringing, etc. Ethicists often refer to akratic states, which are states where an agent acts against their better judgement. Some philosophers argue that nobody ever acts akratically, and that we perform actions that we believe to be the best course of action at the time. Thus, failure to do the right thing is best explained by ignorance or lack of control, rather than akrasia.

Accountability. When an agent performs an action that results in a bad outcome, can we hold them accountable for their action, and respond to them in a way that is appropriate to their action? The crucial question is whether the agent deserves to be punished, i.e. whether the transgression justifies the sanction imposed. One common argument for retributive justice is that it will restore the moral balance that was upset by the transgression. But how are we to determine what the appropriate punishment is? Are crime and punishment positively correlated?

If it is true that moral responsibility does not exist, then what are the implications for morality in general? Can we still make moral judgements about people's actions? Joyce thinks not. First, he roughly classifies four types of moral judgements:

• axiological judgements, which concern what is of value (good or bad);
• deontic judgements, which concern moral obligations and permissions (right or wrong);
• aretaic judgements, which concern character and persons (virtue or vice);
• hypological judgements, which concern moral responsibility and desert (praise or blame).

Taking the non-existence of hypological judgements as given, Joyce argues that the other three types of judgements are also undermined.

If moral responsibility does not exist, then we cannot conclude that an outcome is morally good or bad. Consider an example involving an agent that lacks moral agency, say, a shark. It would be absurd to call a shark attack a morally bad outcome. Joyce doesn't deny that this outcome is bad, but he denies that it is morally bad.

If moral responsibility does not exist, then we cannot conclude that an action is morally right or wrong. We can still make various deontic judgements. Joyce gives several examples of deontic judgements involving non-moral agents:

• ought of expectation: "If it's migratory season, then the birds ought to fly south"; here we are making a prediction based on natural past behaviour;
• hypothetical ought: "If zebras want to avoid predators, then they ought to steer clear of long grass"; here we are making deontic judgements about zebras, not to zebras;
• institutional ought: "My dog ought not to bark at the mailman"; here I am establishing a norm which I am willing to apply to my dog.

In all these cases, we are making deontic judgements, but there is nothing moral about them.

If moral responsibility does not exist, then we cannot conclude that a person is morally virtuous or vicious. One way of showing this is to define virtue or vice in terms of the actions that a person performs. If a person performs a morally wrong action, then they are morally vicious. But since we have shown that we cannot make moral deontic judgements about people's actions, we cannot conclude that a person is morally bad. However, virtue ethicists often hold that character comes first: wrong actions are those that are performed by a morally bad person. Nevertheless, we still wouldn't be able to conclude that a person is morally bad. Consider some non-moral agents:

• a good polar bear: one that is violent and predatory; here we are making an aretaic judgement based on the teleological function of a polar bear, which is to hunt and kill;
• a good vacuum cleaner: one that cleans well; here we are also using teleological reasoning, but on human artefacts;
• a good dog: one that doesn't bark at the mailman; here the aretaic judgement is made according to some normative system that I have established.

In all these cases, we are making aretaic judgements, but there is nothing moral about them.