Moral Error Theory - II
Chapter 2, Argument by Elimination, Joyce (2024)
14 Nov 2024
In this chapter, Joyce provides a set of arguments against some alternatives to moral error theory. Specifically, he argues against noncognitivism, moral non-objectivism, moral non-naturalism, and moral intuitionism.
Noncognitivists hold that moral judgements are not truth-apt (i.e. we cannot say that they are true or false), but rather express noncognitive attitudes such as approval or disapproval. A variant of noncognitivism is pure noncognitivism, which holds that moral judgements are purely non-assertoric, i.e. they do not even express other noncognitive attitudes such as approval or disapproval. Joyce rejects this variant of noncognitivism, and argues that moral judgements do function as assertions. When we utter something, we indicate an intention or belief or some other mental state. But our utterance can either be sincere or insincere. If I utter something to indicate an intention or belief, but I don't actually have that intention or belief, then I am insincere. Joyce uses this to show that moral judgements are truth-apt: when someone makes a moral judgement, they are either sincere or insincere. Either way, a sincerity condition exists for the belief attached to the judgement, which implies that the judgement expresses some belief about the world, which further implies that moral judgements are assertions about the world.
Thus, making moral judgements commits us to the world being a certain way. But in what way? The moral objectivist and moral error theorist might say that moral judgements commit us to the existence of objective moral facts. A moral non-objectivist is someone who denies this claim, and argues that moral judgements commit us to other things that are not necessarily objective. The first task is to pin down what objectivity means. Joyce uses Tropman's definition, which roughly states that objective moral facts are such that they do not depend only on some agent's belief or non-cognitive attitudes. Thus, a moral non-objectivist will hold that moral facts are determined by the beliefs or noncognitive attitudes of some agents. But what kind of agents? A proponent of Divine Command Theory (DCT) might treat God as an agent, which implies that moral facts depend on God's commands. But if we also accept that atheism is true, then there would be no moral facts, because God doesn't exist.
Even the non-theistic moral non-objectivist would run into problems. Joyce points out that any responses mounted by a moral non-objectivist would have to be either absolutist or relativist in flavor. In the absolutist version, moral facts would be determined by the beliefs or noncognitive attitudes of some agent or group of agents that do not vary across different contexts (DCT is one example). The secular absolutist may appeal to actual agents or hypothetical agents, though they usually appeal to the latter (how do you decide which real agents to appeal to?). But the problem with this approach is that people don't have any reason to care about the moral facts determined by these idealized agents. We do take ourselves to have reasons to care about morality, therefore it is implausible that our moral facts would be determined by these idealized agents. If we loosen the absolutist constraint and consider the relativist version of moral non-objectivism, then we get more options in terms of which agents to appeal to. One attractive option is to appeal to the individual: moral facts for me will be determined by my beliefs or noncognitive attitudes, and for you it will be determined by your beliefs or noncognitive attitudes. This approach, however, is also problematic. When moral facts are solely determined by someone's mental state, then it's hard to criticize them for being mistaken about their moral beliefs or attitudes. We wouldn't be able to claim that someone is mistaken for judging that, say, kindness is morally wrong, or that cruelty is morally right. It would be impossible to settle moral disputes, since there's nothing to appeal to beyond our own beliefs and attitudes.
Joyce criticizes the moral non-naturalists next. A moral non-naturalist posits that moral facts belong to a special category of facts that cannot be accommodated within the natural world, i.e. the world that can be investigated by scientific inquiry. If this is true, then by what means do we come to know these moral facts? The standard answer is that we have a faculty of moral intuition, which allows us to perceive these moral facts directly. In other words, moral intuitions are prima facie justified, unless some evidence to the contrary is provided. One way is to check our intuitions and see if they are consistent with our observations of the world. The problem with moral intuitionism is that there is a substantial body of empirical evidence showing that they are not reliable. Our moral judgements are easily swayed by other seemingly irrelevant factors, such as the order in which we consider cases, or the way in which the cases are presented to us. Emotions also play a role. Plus, moral judgements are often self-serving, in that we tend to give ourselves more moral leeway than we do others. One common response mounted by the moral intuitionist to any objection is to say that the objector sympathizes with some morally repugnant view (e.g. genocide). The presumption is that admitting that nothing is wrong with such views amounts to sympathising with such views. But this is a false presumption: one can think that there's nothing wrong with genocide, but also think that there's nothing right with it either.
To summarize: