Moral Error Theory - I
Chapter 1, Mackie's Arguments for Error Theory, Joyce (2024)
13 Nov 2024
In this chapter, Joyce introduces Mackie's (1977) argument for moral error theory as a launching point for his own discussion of the topic later.
Moral judgements appear to ascribe a property or relation to the world. When we make moral judgments, we commit ourselves to the world being a certain way: that things do have these properties, and that things do stand in these relations. If I assert that my dog is blue, but my dog lacks the property of blueness, then I have made an error. If I assert that my dog is a unicorn, then, again, I have made an error, but this time a slightly different error. Some things are blue, just not my dog, but nothing has the property of being a unicorn. For the moral error theorist, moral properties are a bit like unicorns: they do not exist.
For Mackie, when we engage in moral discourse, we commit ourselves to the existence of objective values and objective prescriptions, but the world does not contain these features, thus rendering our moral judgements mistaken. Mackie doesn't deny that subjective values is possible: to say that something is good is to say that it satisfies some requirements or wants or interests, in this case our wants or interests, nor does he deny that we can have subjective prescriptions: we ought to do something presumably because doing so is the best way to satisfy our desire (including desires or goals stemming from our human institutions, e.g. playing and winning at chess.) What he denies is that there are objective values or prescriptions, out there, in the nature of things, independent of our wants or interests.
Joyce raises a problem with Mackie's conceptual premise. If we accept that moral discourse commits us to objective values and prescriptions, and we argue that these do not exist, does it make sense to continue talking about morality (perhaps in some other way that does not involve a commitment to objectivity), or is the commitment an essential feature of morality such that denying it would necessarily require that we abandon morality altogether? The problem here is that there is no method for deciding when a discourse is committed to a thesis (such that the denial of the thesis would amount to changing the topic) versus when it is merely contingently associated with the thesis.
Joyce then discusses Mackie's three arguments for moral error theory, the first two of which he renames:
The Argument from Diversity is based on the observation that moral views vary across cultures and individuals. If there are objective moral facts, then it would be reasonable to expect that there would be some convergence on these facts. But this is not what we observe. Mackie introduces two possible explanations for this diversity: either there are objective moral facts, but we have limited epistemic access to them, hence the diversity, or there are no objective moral facts, and moral codes are just reflections of different social practices. Mackie argues that the latter is more plausible, and he backs this up by claiming that cultures begin by developing social practices, and then they construct moral codes that align with these practices. Although forceful, Joyce notes that Mackie's argument is not completely airtight. For instance, Mackie's claim that moral codes stem out of social practices is still compatible with the realist view that there are objective moral facts (perhaps different social practices distort our access to these facts, thus explaining the diversity.) However, Joyce also notes that there is no reason to suppose that objectivity would necessarily lead to convergence. All in all, Joyce thinks that the Argument from Diversity is forceful enough as an argument against moral realism.
The Argument from Strangeness is based on the observation that moral properties are strange from the perspective of what we now know how the universe works. For instance, Clarke argued that moral properties are capable of producing demands on us to act in certain ways, demands which are somehow there, in the nature of things. This is strange, how can the nature of things demand anything from us? How can there be demands without a demander? One might object by saying that we believe in other strange things (e.g. quarks, blackholes), but Joyce argues that moral properties are strange in a strange way. A black hole sucks, but it doesn't demand anything from us. It seems reasonable, then, to doubt the existence of moral properties. But doubting is different from denying. Strangeness provides valid grounds for skepticism, stronger grounds if we can come up with some hypothesis that would explain away the strangeness. Thus, the Argument from Strangeness does provide some support for moral error theory, but it is not conclusive. It provides grounds for doubting the existence of moral properties, but it is questionable whether it provides strong enough grounds for denying their existence. Still, it is a powerful argument against moral realism. Mackie adds that moral properties are strange in the epistemological sense as well: how can we know about these properties? They are not natural, which is to say that we cannot know about them through our usual methods of knowing, i.e. perception, inference, etc.
The Argument from Objectification provides an explanation for how moral beliefs, though mistaken, become so entrenched. One might oppose moral error theory by arguing that the consequences of the theory is too counterintuitive: they seem to go against our moral intuitions. The Argument from Objectification, thus, is Mackie's attempt at explaining where these intuitions come from. He argues that our moral beliefs are the product of objectification or projectivism. We objectify our subjective emotional responses to certain situations, which leads us to see the world containing features that are not there. For instance, when we witness a situation, and experience some emotion of dislike, we do not merely think that we dislike the situation, we project this dislike onto the situation, and experience the situation as demanding the response of dislike, i.e. as morally wrong. Now, there are empirical evidence that supports the claim that emotion plays a role in moral judgements, but there is still a lack of clarity on what objectification and projection are supposed to be. But Joyce reminds us that Mackie is not trying to provide a full-blown theory of moral psychology, he is merely trying to provide an explanation for how moral beliefs can be mistaken and entrenched. The point is that our moral intuitions do not just come out of nowhere, it is possible to provide some kind of explanation for their existence.
Joyce concludes the chapter by noting that Mackie's arguments are strong, but they are not conclusive. Mackie may be wrong in thinking that morality commits us to objective values and prescriptions (perhaps they commit us to something else), or it may turn out that, strange as they are, moral properties do exist in the world. There is also the problem with Mackie's conceptual premise itself, as noted earlier. Still, even if it turns out that his arguments are false, this wouldn't imply that moral error theory itself is invalid. It is possible to come up with alternative arguments for moral error theory. In the rest of the book, Joyce attempts to present his own arguments for moral error theory that does not rely on the conceptual premise that moral discourse commits us to objectivity.